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Once we acknowledge and accept our finitude, we can concern
ourselves with living well, and care first and most for the wellbeing of our souls, and not so much for their mere existence . . . .
(L. Kass cited by Callahan, p . 75)
As the generation of the baby boom has made its way through its life
span, various institutions of our society have felt the strain of its numbers .
In our youth, it was the educational system which first felt the impact. Now
it is the economy and job market and , as we approach old age, the pinch
will be felt elsewhere. This is evidenced in the growing political attention to
services and care for the elderly. Combined with significant advances in
modern medicine , we are facing what Daniel Callahan calls "a
demographic, economic, and medical avalanche ."
It is not surprising, therefore , that the perennial question of rationing
health care has been discussed with more urgency in recent years. The
second half of 1987 saw the arrival of a new book by Callahan, director of
the Hastings Center medical ethics research institute , which addresses this
concern. His book, Setting Limits: Medical Goals in an Aging Society ,
suggests rationing of medical care , in part, on consideration of age. The
purposes of this volume are to "stimulate a public discussion of the future
of health care for the aged . .. " and to "propose a different way of
understanding that care than is commonly considered : that of using age as
a specific criterion for the allocation and limitation of health care" (23).
November, 1988

57

/

In taking up this call for public discussion, I wish to review Callahan's
proposal, assess its strengths and weaknesses as a contribution to the
debate over health care rationing, and suggest directions to push analysis
further.
Callahan's analysis ranges over a variety of topics - the meaning of
aging, the goals of medicine, moral relations between the generations, and
resource allocation. It is useful, therefore, to begin with a summary of the
general principles of his position. Callahan states them as follows:
I. Government has a duty, based on our collective social obligation, to help
peo ple live out a natural life span, but not actively to help extend life medically
beyond that point.
2. Government is obliged to develop, employ, and pay for only that kind and
degree of life-extending technology necessa ry for medicine to achieve and serve
the end of a natural life span: the question is not whether a technology is available
that can save a life, but whether there is an obligation to use the technology.
3. Beyond the point of a natural life span, government should provide only the
means necessary for the relief of suffering, not life-extending technology. (137-38)

Within this framework of principles, then , let us look more closely at
specifics of Callahan's proposal. Although the economic concern of
escalating medical costs remains constantly in the background of his
discussion, Callahan sees the issue of limits to health care to the elderly
within a broader philosophical context. He asks us to consider, for
example, the question of the meaning of aging. Old age, he suggests, has
been robbed of meaning (the internal sense of one's life as purposive and
coherent) and significance (the social recognition of the value of old age) .
He sees this failure as derived in large part from what he calls the
"modernization of aging". This he describes as arising from the belief that
human ingenuity, using the tools of reason and science, can make all
spheres of nature, including the aging process , malleable to human
manipulation, directed at the creation of an increasingly better future (26) .
This, in turn, has resulted in an inability to deal directly and honestly with
the possibility of finding significance in suffering and decline. And it has
issued in the "medicalization" of old age. The power of the meaning of the
inevitability of decline and death has weakened against the increasing
vision of old age, or the elements of aging, as medical problems which, like
other medical problems, are amenable to intervention, manipulation, and
conquest.
A Callahan Suggestion
In contrast, Callahan suggests that old age be seen as one of several life
stages in a natural life span, each with its own meaning and significance
and set within a social web of cooperation among generations. Old age as
such, rather than the accidental qualities of some elderly (free time,
spendable income, etc.) should be seen as meaningful. Although he does

58

Linacre Quarterly

not spell it out with sufficient detail and clarity, Callahan appears to find
that meaning in the concept of service to the future by means of serving the
young.
If the young are to flourish , then the old should step as id e in an active way,
working until the very e nd to do what they can to leave behind them a world
hopeful for the young and worthy of bequest. The acceptance of their aging and
death will be the principal stimulus to doing this. It is this see mingly paradoxical
combination of withdrawal to prepare for death and a n active, helpful leavetaking oriented toward the young, which provides the possibility for meaning and
significance . ... (43)

Coorelative to Callahan's analysis of the meaning of aging as service to
the young is his discussion of the responsibility of the young toward the
old. This is part of his stress on intergenerational obligations, of social
ethics. As in an earlier article (1985), Callahan struggles to establish the
philosophical grounding for moral responsibility of the young toward the
old. He examines, and in turn finds weakness in, several traditional
arguments for the filial obligation of children toward elderly parents:
reciprocity for earlier support by parents, ties of emotion, implied
"contractual" obligations , friendship, and gratitude (88-91). Failing to find
an unequivocal principle for obligation among these, Callahan posits the
uniqueness of the origin and nature of the parent-child bond as a product
of a sui generis period of nurturance, intimacy, and sharing. This combines
with what he calls the "power of need and dependence" to be a potent basis
for a claim of obligation (91-94).
Callahan's struggle at this point results, I believe, from his failure, when
borrowing the analysis of family obligation from his earlier article, to
transpose it to the socia! ethical framework proposed in his current book.
It is not a question of the relation of individual children to individual
parents which should be central here, but rather the intergenerational
obligation of upcoming generations to those who precede them. In that
light, the answer to Callahan's search for a basis of obligation lies in the
nature of the organism - i.e., society - which is the focus of his analysis.
If we are, in fact , to see ourselves as a socia! organism - with those in each
life stage playing an interacting role - then the very reciprocity of roles
may be a foundation for obligation. As the old prepare the way for and
make way for the young, the young provide the care context for that role to
be played . This also furnishes a clearer framework for Callahan's attempt
to balance familial and societal (governmental) sharing of responsibility
for the elderly. Both have obligations to the old. Physical help and
affection are seen by Callahan as central to the role of children toward
needy parents. On the other hand , basic economic and medical support
- increasingly burdensome in the context of greater life expectancy and
chronic illness among the elderly - can be shared by all "children" of one
generation for the "parent" generation preceding them through
government (and other social agencies) as an expression of intergenerational moral ties.
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Medicine in Relation to Elderly
If acceptance of decline and death is part of the meaning of aging and it
is the obligation of succeeding generations in society to help the elderly
accomplish this in a meaningful way, how are we to understand the goal of
medicine in relation to the old? Callahan proposes that "medicine should
be used not for the further extension of the life ofthe aged, but only for the
full achievement of a natural and fitting life span and thereafter for the
relief of suffering" (53) . Recognizing that the quantity of life is not
indefinitely extensible, he opts for the role of medicine as enhancing the
quality of a reasonable life cycle. Of what would such a life cycle consist?
Callahan describes it as one in which I) one' s "life possibilities" - e.g. ,
work, love, family , social life, pursuit of ideals , and the experience of
beauty, travel, knowledge, etc. - have had the opportunity to be
accomplished ; 2) one's moral obligations to others, especially family; have
been met; and 3) one's death , because it comes after a full life, will not be
felt by others as an offense to moral and social sensibility (66-72). He
defines a "natural life span", then, as "one in which life possibilities have
on the whole been achieved after which death may be understood as a sad,
but nonetheless relatively acceptable event" (66) . Callahan specifies
further that to be "tolerable" after a person has achieved this life span,
death must also be characterized as "not . .. marked by unbearable and
degrading pain" (72).
This leads him to a statement of policy that medicine should have as its
goals, both for current technology and research, the prevention of
"premature death", i.e., death before the living out of the natural life span
he has described and thereafter, the minimization of pain and suffering
(148-49). Callahan's preference for quality over quantity of life is not
unique in medical ethics. But the addition of its link to a concept of a
natural life span does give it a somewhat different focus. The reason for his
designation of this life span as extending approximately to the late 70s or
early 80s, however, seems arbitrary and is probably based on present
medically achievable life expectancies. Why the terminus would not be
defined differently in past or future medical contexts is not clear. Nor is it
evident that the greater life enrichment opportunities which are becoming
available to older, healthy elderly persons can be dismissed as secondary
to the fulfillment of "life possibilities" in his proposed definition of a
natural,life span. Though he seems hesitant to do so, Callahan may have to
accept greater flexibility in defining the chronological terminus in his
concept of life span.
Where Callahan's proposal has special merit is its application to medical
research. Noting that physical mobility, mental alertness , and emotional
stability are often undercut by chronic illness, pain, and suffering,
Callahan suggests that the focus of geriatric medical research should not
be on life extension, but rather on. those conditions which diminish the
quality of living for many elderly, e.g., dementia (characteristic of
Alzheimer's disease) , hearing impairment, osteoporosis, osteoarthritis, etc.
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Increasing Limitations and Costs
Although his analysis of the meaning of aging, intergenerational moral
relat ions , and the goals of medicine stand logically on their own , it is the
rapidly increasing limitation of resources and escalating medical costs
which had the most to do with provoking his desire to bring conscious and
systematic consideration to the issue of allocation of society's medical and
fiscal resources. Callahan sees the dilemma as real and not to be resolved
by greater efficiency in medicine or reallocation from other areas of social
expenditure (123-28) . Besides, he argues, approached from the modern
medicalized view of aging, any savings gained in one area would be
swallowed up by the - in principle - limitless vision of conquering the
aging process. And , in any case , this search for "external" solutions fails to
confront the more fundamental philosophical issues referred to above issues which should be faced regardless of the problem of limited
resources.
According to Callahan, public funding of medical care for the elderly
should be based on a commitment by the young, both personally and
through the institutions of society, to assist in the achievement of a
"natural life span" and to allay "economic and social anxieties" associated
with aging (118) . Such a policy is not a withdrawal of support for the
elderly, but only a chronological limit to life-extending medical care. In
other respects, this policy calls for expanded support in other elements of
Medicare, Medicaid , Social Security, etc. In fact , in order to achieve his
goals of a natural life span and a tolerable death, Callahan's policy may not
be the allocation limitation program he seems to intend it to be. Achieving
his goals may be just as increasingly costly as the life-extending medical
care he wants to limit. Although there is limitation in the sense that both
life extension and life enhancement are not pursued equally, it may be
better to interpret his proposals more in terms of reallocation of resources
within medicine.
This policy leads to a termination of treatment (in particular,
termination of publicly funded treatment) for the aged, based on three
general criteria which, although they might be applied at any age, he sees as
having added relevance for the aged. These are I) the inability to relieve
pain and suffering; 2) disproportionate burden imposed by treatment; and
3) inability to restore or maintain minimum quality of life. The latter he
defines as the capacity to reason, to feel emotion, and to enter relationships
with others (177-80) .
Based on these criteria, Callahan outlines standards for morally
appropriate (and , therefore, eligible for public funding) medical care for
the elderly. These are based on considerations of the patient's physical and
mental status and quality of life on the one hand , and levels of possible
medical and nursing care on the other. Patients who are brain dead should
be declared dead and no further treatment given . Those in a persistent
vegetative state should be provided palliative nursing care, but death
should not be resisted . Patients characterized by severe dementia, mild to
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moderate impairment of competence, and those who , though mentally
alert, are severely ill are appropriate recipients not only of palliative care
but also general medical care, e.g. , antibiotics, surgery, nutrition and
hydration , though primarily for relief of suffering rather than life
extension. Both nursing palliation and general medical care should be
available to those mentally alert persons who, though physically frail, are
not severely ill. In addition, intensive care and advanced life support can
be provided, though not for an extended time unless necessary to relieve
suffering. Finally, a physically vigorous , mentally alert elderly person is
eligible, even at public expense, for all levels of care previously described
and, in addition, emergency life-saving intervention until such a time as
the person deteriorates into one of the other categories (180-85) .

Particulars are Debatable
Callahan's attempt to give specificity to the definition and implementation of his policy is a worthwhile step. Disagreement over particulars is to
be expected (Callahan himself sees his book as an initiation of a long, but
necessary public debate). Callahan notes, but does not thoroughly discuss,
several issues which are difficult both philosophically and practically, e.g.,
avoiding the creation of a coercive atmosphere in which an "obligation to
die" might subtly be felt by the elderly; the establishment of sufficient
social support for the elderly in other areas so that this limitation is not
perceived as abandonment; the possible sense of injustice felt because only
some persons may be able to pursue extended life apart from public
funding; and pressures felt by families of those who wish to pursue
extended life, but who are unable to afford it themselves.
Callahan leaves many questions still open. But the author knew this was
the case. His goal, he said, was to "stimulate a public discussion of the
future of health care for the aged" (23). It is possible to find in this volume
a thoughtful and sensitive attention to the broad underlying issues which
should frame future debate on this topic - the meaning of aging, decline,
and death; the relation of life extension and life enhancement as goals of
medicine; a social ethic of mutual moral relations among generations; and
an acceptance of distinguishing levels of appropriate care in achieving a
tolerable death.
In advancing this public debate, I see several necessary steps: I)
Callahan has limited his analysis to setting medical limits for the elderly.
Justice and the reality of the broad expanse of medicine will call for
extension of this debate to other areas of health care also. The discussion
may ultimately have to be framed in terms which, though they may include
age considerations, cut across age boundaries per se. The recent Hastings
Center report on "Ethical Challenges of Chronic Illness", (Jennings,
Callahan, Caplan), may be an example of such a formulation . Similarly,
one may be able to work toward a concept parallel to Callahan's "natural
life span" which could refer to those at earlier points in the life cycle who
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are facing more limited chronological expectations. This would allow the
application of some of his principles regarding extension and
enhancement of life to other persons for whom relief of pain and suffering
may also take moral priority over mere prolongation of life.
(2) It is not clear that the limits Callahan is proposing actually would
produce absolute limits of resource usage. The pursuit of a natural life
span and a quality-enhanced tolerable death may be just as expensive as
following after life extension. The debate would more honestly, and
therefore more productively, be cast in terms of reallocation of medical
resources. In this context, issues of efficiency, technical advances,
examination of other social priorities , etc. , may have more of it role than
Callahan seems to give them.
(3) Finally, in terms of Callahan's specific interest in old age, further
work is needed on defining the meaning and significance of aging. A
clarification of the relation between serving others and self-fulfillment is
necessary. Furthermore, the increased opportunity for personal growth
and life enrichment among the elderly can be given greater examination as
to its implications for the concept of "experiencing life's possibilities".
The significance of Callahan's discussion for the emerging public debate
over allocation of medical resources, especially in relation to the elderly,
will probably not be known for some time. Callahan himself recognizes
that this debate, since it must result in a changed social consensus in order
to have any serious structural effect on the provision of medical care in
society, will not take place easily or quickly. But that he has drawn our
attention to fundamental philosophical issues which should be as
consciously addressed as they are subconsciously assumed is, to my
thinking, already an important contribution.
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